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Abstract 
The  forestry  and  reindeer  herding  sectors  utilize  the  same  land  in  northern  Sweden,  and 
adversely  affect  each  other’s  productivity.  The  common  pool  resource  character  of  this 
situation has made it difficult to find ways to resolve conflicts that could threaten the two 
sectors’  continued  co-existence.  A  consultation  procedure  that  was  introduced  to  reduce 
conflicts does not appear to be effective, since conflicts between the two actors still occur. 
One reason for this failure might be found in the power distribution between forestry and 
reindeer  herding.  Earlier  research  has  shown  that  a  co-management  system  in  which  the 
allocation of power between the stakeholders is uneven is difficult to maintain in the long 
term. However, it is unclear just how uneven the power distribution is between the two actors 
in this case, and the consequences the disparity might have for the viability and stability of the 
management system. Focusing on the power relations within the consultation procedures, this 
paper explores the potential of the present institutional system to take the different interests of 
the stakeholders into account and to use the consultation procedures as tools for co-managing 
the forest resources in northern Sweden.  
Keywords: co-management, common pool resource theory, forest resource, forest sector, land 
use conflict, reindeer herding sector, Sámi  
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1. Introduction 
The  indigenous  people  in  Sweden,  the  Sámi,  have  the  exclusive  right  to  herd  reindeer 
(Rangifer tarandus tarandus) on approximately 40 % of the Swedish land area in order to 
produce meat. However, a large proportion of the land used for reindeer herding in northern 
Sweden
1 is also productive forest land (some owned by public companies, while other areas 
are owned by non-industrial private owners and the government) that produces timber and 
pulpwood, and contributes significantly to the Swedish economy. Thus, foresters and reindeer 
herders comprise two distinct groups of people who use the same land to a large extent, but 
for different purposes, and this multiple use of the forest resources in the northern parts of 
Sweden  is  a  source  of  conflict.  Furthermore,  reindeer  herding  is  not  only  of  economic 
importance to the Sámi, it also plays an important role in Sámi culture (Lundmark, 1998). 
Thus, these issues have both economic and cultural dimensions. 
  
The common pool resource character of this situation has made it difficult to find ways to 
resolve conflicts that could threaten the two sectors’ continued co-existence. On the one hand, 
modern forestry has been argued to be one of the major threats to the future of reindeer 
herding, and thus to Sámi culture (Danell, 2004). Forestry proponents, on the other hand, 
contend that the economic implications of adjusting to the needs of the reindeer herding sector 
by,  for  example,  conserving  areas  that  are  suitable  for  final  fellings,  is  not  economically 
defensible  (Björklund,  2000).  In  order  to  reduce  conflicts  between  the  two  sectors, 
consultation procedures were introduced by the Swedish parliament in 1979 and about 20 
years later they were extended to cover a larger geographical area through the certification 
system  run  by  the  Forest  Stewardship  Council,  FSC  (Swedish  Forestry  Act,  1979:429; 
Swedish Reindeer Husbandry Act, 1971:437; www.fsc-sverige.org). Since the purpose of the 
consultation  procedures  is  to  resolve  conflicts  between  the  sectors  by  establishing 
arrangements that allow the two industries to co-exist, the procedures have many similarities 
to a co-management system that involves the major stakeholders in negotiations concerning 
the use of a common resource. However, the consultation procedures do not seem to fulfil 
their purpose since conflicts between the two actors are still ongoing, partly because there are 
unresolved issues concerning property rights. While forest companies are the owners of the 
resource,  reindeer  herders  have  usufructuary  rights.  Although  current  law  guarantees  the 
members of reindeer herding communities the right to use land for reindeer herding, hunting 
and fishing, earlier research has shown that reindeer herders have difficulty claiming these 
rights. The laws and legal procedures regulating the relationships between the two sectors do 
not  seem  to  give  sufficient  protection  to  the  natural  grazing  areas  needed  for  reindeer 
husbandry, thus creating an imbalance in property rights (Swedish Reindeer Husbandry Act, 
1971:437; Hahn, 2000; Widmark, in press). The imbalance in property rights is manifested 
through  an  uneven  power  distribution  between  the  stakeholders  within  the  consultation 
procedure  system,  which  in  turn  might  affect  the  possibilities,  especially  for  the  reindeer 
herding sector, to influence the outcome of the consultation procedures. Hence, since access 
to free grazing areas is vital to the economy of the reindeer herding sector the uneven power 
distribution has direct economic implications for reindeer herders, notably losses of free-range 
grazing  areas  and  consequent  increases  in  the  need  to  provide  fodder  for  the  reindeer. 
Similarly, the adjustment of forestry to reindeer herding also has economic implications, for 
example conserving areas that are ready for harvesting, although probably not to the same 
extent as vice versa. This has been confirmed in evaluations of the consultation system, which 
                                                 
1 In this paper, northern Sweden is defined as the counties of Norrbotten, Västerbotten and Jämtland. 
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have found indications of widespread dissatisfaction among the reindeer herders, while the 
forest companies seem to be more satisfied with them (National Board of Forestry 1987; 
1992; 2001). 
However,  the  unevenness  of  the  power  distribution  and  the  potential  of  the  consultation 
system to provide opportunities to renegotiate the relationship between the two actors over 
time are unclear. Focusing on the power distribution within the consultation procedures, this 
study explores the potential of the present institutional system to take the different interests of 
the stakeholders into account and thus to use the consultation procedure as a tool for co-
managing the forest resources in northern Sweden. Specific questions addressed include the 
following.  What  are  the  perceptions  about  the  institutional  system  among  the  two 
stakeholders?  Does  the  present  consultation  system  fulfil  the  characteristics  of  a  co-
management arrangement, and is the present institutional framework an appropriate means for 
resolving conflicts between the two actors? 
 
2. Co-management  
 
Power sharing and partnership are essential components of the definition of co-management. 
Co-management,  however,  often  refers  to  a  system  where  the  State  and  local  actors  are 
successfully  integrated  (Berkes,  1994).  Since  co-management  also  stresses  the  need  for 
decentralized governance, the definition has a resemblance to the concept of governance, 
which  takes  into  consideration  the  process  of  interaction  between  different  societal  and 
political actors, and the growing interdependence between them. The concept of governance 
also implies that it is not necessary for the State to be involved in the day-to-day management 
of a natural resource. As in the case considered here, the State may delegate the management 
authority to the actors themselves by providing an institutional framework through legal acts 
(Kooiman, 2003). However, depending on how the institutional framework for management is 
constructed, the power distribution within the management arrangements among the actors 
may vary significantly. 
 
 To measure the power distribution between involved actors in a co-management arrangement 
we use a framework developed from a few well established co-management spectrums. The 
ladder of co-management shown in Figure 1, is adopted from Fikret Berkes (1994, see also 
Pinkerton, 1994; Campbell, 1996; De Paoli, 1999) and initially from Sherry Arnstein (1969). 
Arnstein’s ladder is founded on the classical Dahlian notion of power, namely that actor “A 
has the power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not 
otherwise  do”  (Dahl,  1957)  and  locates  this  source  of  power  within  a  management 
arrangement.  The  bottom  rungs  of  Arnstein’s  ladder,  “Manipulation”  and  “Therapy”, 
describing situations where the actors are completely powerless are omitted from the figure. 
The three first rungs included in the figure represent what Arnstein defines as degrees of 
tokenism “that allows the have-nots to hear and have a voice.” (1969:217) However under 
these  conditions  “they  lack  the  power  that  their  views  will  be  heeded  by  the  powerful.” 
(1969:217).  Further  up  the  ladder  are  levels  of  increasing  power  and  on  rung  7  all  the 
involved actors establish a ‘partnership of equals’.  This implies that not all of the rungs 
qualify as co-management arrangements (Jentoft, 2003) (see fig. 1).  
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7  Partnership  Partnership as equals; joint formal, institutionalised decision-making. 
6  Management  
Boards 
Local  actors  are  given  the  opportunity  to  participate  in  developing  and 
implementing plans and input plays more than just an advisory role. 
5  Co-operation  Local actors have input into management and local knowledge is solicited; 
community members are involved at a low level as assistants or guides, still 
limited by management agencies. 
4  Advisory 
Committees 
Partnership in decision-making starts; joint actions on common objectives and 
local actors have an advisory role only; decisions are non-binding. 
3  Communication  Start  of  two-way  information  exchange;  local  concerns  begin  to  enter 
management plans; joint management actions may take place without joint 
jurisdiction over the resource. 
2  Dialogue  Start of face-to-face contact, local actors input is heard but not necessarily 
heeded (usually involved late in the decision-making process); limitation of 
involvement continues to be set by the government agency. 
1  Informing  Local  actors  are  informed  about  decisions  already  made,  one-way 
communication between government and the community. 
 (Adapted from Arnstein, 1969; Berkes, 1994) 
 
Fig. 1. Ladder of co-management  
 
According to Evelyn Pinkerton there has been a tendency to apply the term co-management to 
mere operational rights, i.e.,, rules that regulate the day-to-day use of the resource concerned. 
This  is  also  one  of  the  reasons  why  there  have  been  such  difficulties  in  defining  the 
parameters  of  co-management.  However,  as  Pinkerton  points  out,  “co-management  is 
misnamed unless it involves at least the right to participate in making key decisions” about 
how the resource should be used, by whom and to what extent (2003). In other words, all of 
the principal actors involved must have a degree of power in order to define a situation as a 
co-management arrangement. According to the definitions of Jentoft and Pinkerton, and in 
accordance with Arnstein, the three lowest rungs of the ladder of co-management cannot, 
thus, be defined as co-management arrangements. Rung four, where the weaker actor has an 
advisory role, might be defined as the lowest form of co-management. These categories are, 
of course, simplifications of the way co-management arrangements work. In practice, a co-
management arrangement may include several of the rungs, and the balance of power among 
the actors may change over time. However, the first three rungs of the ladder should not be 
neglected  as  they  could  be  important  steps  towards  establishing  co-management 
arrangements.  
 
Arnsteins ladder has had considerably influence on conceptual thinking about power sharing 
as the ladder illustrates a power continuum whose opposite poles, in this case are information 
and partnership (Abbott, 1996). Since the ladder is based on Dahl’s minimalist definition of 
power in contrast to the more complex definitions made by for example Bacharach & Baratz 
(1970) and Lukes (1974), there is an obvious risk of excluding important aspects of power. 
However the more complex views of power represented by Bacharach & Baratz (1970) and 
Lukes  (1974)  will  give  more  complex  definitions  of  power,  which  in  turn  makes  them 
difficult to use empirically. Since this study includes almost 50 interviews it is necessary to 
use a framework with clear operational definitions and the ladder of co-management provides 
a useful way of conceptualizing the power distribution within a co-management arrangement, 
but also if the power distribution change over time from one of relatively low degree of power 
to the equal sharing of power. Like in many of these well established frameworks we assume 
that there is a casual relationship between power and influence over decision-making, the 
more power an actor has the more influence the actor will be able to exercise.   
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The power distribution between the forest and reindeer herding sectors, and consequently the 
two  actors’  possibilities  to  influence  the  outcome  of  decision-making,  are  here  evaluated 
using the ladder of co-management. Since the forestry sector is the owner of the resource and 
is considered to be the stronger party in this relationship, it is the power of the reindeer 
herding sector in relation to the forest sector that will be analyzed in this study. As mentioned 
initially, changing power relations may have direct economic consequences for each of the 
two  sectors.  We  assume  that  the  possibility  for  the  weaker  sector  to  affect  its  situation 
increases as each rung in the co-management ladder is ascended (Mattsson, 1981). However, 
this does not necessarily mean that there is a linear correlation between increased power and 
economic costs or benefits.  Minor adjustments by forest companies to reindeer herding may 
be of great importance to reindeer herding companies. Nevertheless, there have been very few 
studies,  especially  empirical  studies,  concerning  the  economic  implications  of  the  present 
situation or of cases where the two sectors adjust to each other’s needs (for exceptions see 
Mattsson, 1981, Bostedt, et. al., 2003). One reason for this is that the actors themselves lack 
tools to evaluate the economic consequences of different actions and thus to evaluate – in 
economic terms – the consequences that changing power relations would have for each of the 
sectors. However, both actors agree that such changes would have consequences, and that the 
economic implications for each sector need further research. Due to the difficulties involved 
in  quantifying  proposed  measures  this  study  focuses  on  relevant  political  rather  than 
economic considerations, although we believe that the two are interrelated. 
 
2.1. Conditions for successful co-management  
 
The distribution of power between the partners in a co-management arrangement is not the 
only factor affecting a co-management system. According to Elinor Ostrom (2005), actors are 
more likely to establish a robust or a viable and stable co-manage regime if the institutional 
arrangements are characterized by the eight design principles presented in figure 2.  It is thus 
not only necessary to explore the power relations between the actors in a co-management 
arrangement there are other factors that also has to be considered.  
 
1. Clear boundaries  
 
The boundaries of resources and user groups with right to withdraw resource 
units from the common pool resource are clearly defined. 
2. Correspondence between 
benefits and costs  
 
Allocation rules are related to local conditions. 
3. Collective choice  
 
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in 
modifying the operational rules. 
4. Monitoring  
 
Accountability mechanisms for monitors are devised. 
5. Graduated sanctions  
 
Graduated sanctions are applied to appropriators that deviate from the 
regime. 
6. Conflict resolution 
mechanisms  
 
Low cost, local conflict resolution mechanism is used to resolve conflicts 
among appropriators. 
7. Rights to organize  
 
Users have the right to organize and to make autonomous decisions. 
8. Multi-level governance  
 
Authority is allocated to allow for adaptive governance at multiple levels 
from local to global level. 
 (Adapted from Ostrom, 2005) 
Fig. 2. Design principles for viable and stable co-management regimes  
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The operation of the principles is, according to Ostrom, “bolstered” by the sixth principle – 
the need for low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms – which implies that it is important to 
establish an arena where conflicts among the resource users can be resolved and the power 
over  the  common  resources  might  be  shared.  The  arena  in  this  case  is  the  consultation 
procedures where negotiations are supposed to take place. In addition, principles 3 (collective 
choice), 7 (rights to organize), and 8 (multi-level governance) all have implications for the 
scope  for  the  involved  actors  to  make  decisions  and  to  resolve  conflicts  autonomously. 
However, design principles 7 and 8 are, to some extent, set by the legal framework of the 
consultations.  The  analysis  of  the  consultation  procedures  here  will  consequently  focus 
primarily on collective choice and conflict resolution mechanisms (design principles 3 and 6), 
while the other principles will only be briefly considered in the analysis.  
 
3.    Forestry,  reindeer  husbandry  and  consultation  procedures  in  northern 
Sweden 
 
In northern Sweden, forests cover approximately 9.4 million hectares, constituting about 48% 
of the total land area, and the forest sector is an important part of the Swedish economy. 
About  40%  of  the  forest  harvested  in  Sweden,  in  total,  is  logged  in  the  northern  region 
(Skogsstatistisk årsbok, 2000). Large corporations, non-industrial private forest owners and 
the  government  own  ca.  49.8%,  37.9%  and  5.9%  of  the  forested  land,  respectively, 
collectively  amounting  to  ca.  61  000  owners  (Skogsstatistisk  årsbok,  2004;  Widmark,  in 
press). The same area is also used as grazing land for about 230 000 reindeers, distributed 
between  ca.  4,700  owners.  The  reindeer  owners  are  organised  in  51  Reindeer  Herding 
Communities, RHCs, which are both geographic entities delimiting their respective grazing 
areas, and economic organisations representing their members’ interests (Statistics Sweden, 
1999). The Regional County Administrative Boards in the reindeer herding area restrict the 
total number of reindeers allowed in each RHC depending on the lichen resources available 
(Prop 95/96:226).  
 
The reindeer follow a natural migration cycle, grazing in the mountain regions, or forests 
close to them, during the summer, and in the forest region (closer to the Baltic Sea) during the 
winter period. The reindeer husbandry is dependent on old forests for the provision of fodder 
since reindeer mostly graze ground lichens (Cladina ssp.) and, to a lesser degree, arboreal 
lichens (Alectoria spp. and Bryoria spp.), which are generally much more abundant in old 
forests  than  in  young  forests  (Statistics  Sweden,  1999;  Bostedt  et.  al.,  2003).  Since  the 
reindeer move over large areas the land needed for reindeer husbandry is extensive, and since 
they  do  not  convert  fodder  into  meat  sufficiently  efficient  to  make  providing  alternative 
sources  of  food  for  them  over  prolonged  periods  viable,  the  reindeer  sector  is  highly 
dependent on free-grazing areas (www.lst.ac.se; Frågor och svar om rennäringen, 2000). In 
the northern parts of Sweden, reindeer herders have legal rights to graze reindeer on lands 
owned by the state, forest companies and private non-industrial owners (except for specific 
parts in the southern area) (Swedish Reindeer Husbandry Act, 1971:437, Statistics Sweden, 
1999). In practice, this means that about 75% of the forest area in northern Sweden is used for 
grazing reindeer (Bostedt, 2005). Ostrom’s first design principle –  that the boundaries of the 
resource and the user groups with rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be 
clearly defined – is thus fulfilled.  
 
Since the two sectors use the same forest land, albeit for different purposes, they adversely 
affect each other. However, forestry is affecting the reindeer sector to a greater extent than  
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vice versa (Mattsson, 1981), although the severity of its impact depends on the effects of the 
silvicultural measures applied on the important lichen resources. Both the felling and soil 
scarification  methods  used  may  destroy  the  lichens  for  as  long  as  30  to  40  years  (e.g. 
Gustavsson, 1989; Bostedt et. al., 2003), and due to intensified forestry during the last 50 
years, the proportion of lichen-rich land has decreased greatly (SOU 2001:101; Widmark, in 
press). Together with the decrease in lichen-rich land, which is considered to be the major 
threat to the reindeer sector (Danell 2004), the grazing land is also being fragmented by forest 
road construction and final fellings, forcing the herds to seek food over increasingly large 
areas and making it more difficult to gather them to move to other grazing areas (interviews, 
2004).  
 
To  help  resolve  conflicts  arising  from  the  common  pool  resource  situation  in  northern 
Sweden, the government decided in 1979 to introduce consultation procedures (see Box 1) 
(Swedish  Forestry  Act,  1979:429)  between  the  forest  companies  (in  this  case  public 
companies) and the reindeer sector on forest land where Sámi land-use rights are particularly 
strong.  The  Swedish  Forest  policy,  which  is  based  on  the  principle  of  “freedom-under-
responsibility”, is more oriented towards goals than details, so the consultation procedures are 
generally  formulated  in  terms  of  general  objectives,  while  the  details  are  left  to  the  two 
involved actors to resolve jointly (Kjellin, 2001). 
 
Box 1  
Forestry Act – sections concerning consultations 
Section 20 
Before felling takes place in an area where reindeer husbandry is permitted throughout the 
entire year (year-round grazing areas) in accordance with the Reindeer Husbandry Act, the 
Sami village concerned shall be given the opportunity to participate in joint consultations, as 
stipulated in regulations issued by the Government, or public authority designated by the 
Government. 
  
Section 21 
When applying for felling permission pursuant to section 16 above, the forest owner shall 
describe planned measures to satisfy reindeer husbandry interests. 
In year-round grazing areas, felling is not permitted, if it: 
(i) causes such a significant loss of reindeer grazing land that the possibility to maintain the 
permitted number of reindeer is limited; or 
(ii) precludes the customary grouping and migration of reindeer herds. 
  W h e n  f e l l i n g  p e r m i s s i o n  i s  g r a n t e d ,  t h e  R e g i o n a l  F o r e s t r y  B o a r d  s h a l l  d e c i d e  what 
consideration shall be taken to reindeer husbandry interests as regards, inter alia, the size and 
location of the felling site, and permissible felling method. 
These  conditions  may  only  apply  to  what  is  clearly  required  with  regard  to  the  rights 
applicable to reindeer husbandry. 
 
Section 31 
Forest  management  measures,  which  concern  the  form  and  size  of  felling  areas,  the 
establishment of new stands, the retention of tree groups, and the routing of forest roads, are 
to  take  account  of  essential  reindeer h u s b a n d r y  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  W h e n  p l a n n i n g  a n d  
implementing forest management measures, it is desirable that the Sami village concerned be 
given annual access to both a sufficiently large and cohesive grazing area, and an ample 
amount of vegetation in those areas used for reindeer corralling, migration and resting. 
(source: Swedish Forestry Act 1979:429, translation on www.svo.se) 
 
However,  the  intended  function  of  the  clauses  concerned  was  to  strengthen  the  role  of 
reindeer husbandry in relation to the forest sector (Prop. 1990/91:3). Some of the important 
forest lands used during the winter grazing periods were not covered by the Swedish Forestry 
Act, but as forest companies started to join the FSC, they decided in concert with the RHCs  
    8 
voluntarily  to  apply  the  Swedish  Forestry  Act  across  the  whole  reindeer  grazing  area 
(www.fsc-sverige.org). The same rules are thus applied throughout the entire area, and since 
this  study  explores  the  potential  (and  possible  shortcomings)  of  the  present  institutional 
system it also covers all of the areas covered by the FSC-agreement. 
 
In some areas the free-grazing rights are disputed, but this is mainly with regards to land 
owned by private owners rather than public companies. The private landowners are not yet 
included in the system of consultation procedures, although a governmental investigation has 
proposed that they should be included in the future (SOU 2001:101). 
 
 
Before each harvesting, the forest company has to consult the reindeer herders’ affected by 
final fellings or fellings in preparation for constructing a forest road. In the consultations the 
forest companies outline the areas that will be affected and their proposed actions within a 
timeframe from the immediate future to activities with three- to five-year planning horizons. 
Forest companies are advised to hold consultations at least once a year (SKSFS, 1993:2). 
Discussions and, if possible, negotiations are then held, in which the reindeer herders have 
opportunities  to  propose  other  measures.  Minutes  should  be  taken  during  the  meetings 
regarding the areas that have been discussed, agreements reached and issues that have not 
been  resolved.  Together  with  the  application  for  harvest  permission,  the  forest  company 
should enclose the minutes as well as a duly completed standard form detailing considerations 
made  with  respect  to  reindeer  husbandry  (SKSFS,  1993:2;  Hamilton,  2004).  If  the  forest 
company fails to file the proper documentation regarding consultations, or cannot show that 
representatives  of  the  reindeer  sector  have  been  invited  to  consultations,  permission  for 
harvest can be denied (Prop. 1990/91:3).  
 
4. Method 
 
A case study approach (Merriam, 1994) is used here to investigate the power distribution 
between forestry and reindeer husbandry within the consultation procedure system and its 
implications for the viability of the system used to resolve conflicts between the two sectors.  
 
Semi-structured telephone interviews were conducted with representatives of 32 of the 33 
RHCs covering the mountain area, and 14 representatives of forest companies. The mountain 
RHCs were chosen because they cover the whole reindeer herding area (i.e.,, their reindeer 
migrate from the un-forested mountains to the lowland forests in the winter, and return to the 
mountains in the summer), while the forest RHCs are based in the forests throughout the year, 
and are mainly located in the northern parts of the reindeer herding area. However, the forest 
RHCs are included in the same institutional framework and the results of this study can also 
be applied to their situation. The RHCs were in most cases represented by their respective 
presidents, who in turn represent a number of reindeer herding companies that are members of 
their RHCs. For convenience, when referring to views expressed by these representatives and 
representatives of the forest companies, we often ascribe them to ‘the RHCs’ and ‘the forest 
companies’, respectively, in the following text. In total, the 32 interviewees represent about 
750 reindeer herding companies (www.sjv.se). The 14 representatives of the forest companies 
were selected on the basis of geography and forest ownership, in order to cover the same 
areas  as  the  interviewed  RHC  representatives.    The  interviews  were  conducted  between 
November  2003  and  May  2004.  The  semi-structured  character  of  the  interviews  made  it 
possible to analyze the material quantitatively since some questions were designed in advance 
and posed to all respondents. However the semi-structured interviews were conducted within  
    9 
an open framework, allowing two-way communication and the flexibility to explore relevant 
issues in more depth and detail than would have been possible with a closed framework 
(Merriam, 1994). The consultation procedures have been evaluated three times in the last 20 
years; in 1987, 1992, and 1998 (National Board of Forestry, 1987; 1992; 2001). The interview 
questions were thus related to the results of the evaluations of the consultation procedures in 
order to obtain indications of the system’s evolution over time. Participatory observations 
were  also  made,  when  deemed  appropriate,  in  order  to  gain  further  understanding  of  the 
consultation procedure.  
 
5. Results 
 
5.1. Changes in the significance of consultations over time  
 
The results of the three evaluations and the interviews are not entirely consistent. However, 
when asked about the significance of consultations in the evaluations, roughly half (47-56 %) 
of  the  RHCs  claimed  that  they  have  little  or  no  significance,  while  the  other  ca.  50% 
considered them to have some or considerable significance (Table 1). Since relatively few of 
them considered the consultations to have much significance it seems reasonable to conclude 
that members of the RHCs have retained the view that the consultation procedures are not 
very useful for them.  
  
Table 1. The significance of consultations over time 
 
RHC 
opinion 
1985 
RHC 
opinion 
1990 
RHC 
opinion 
1998 
 
 
 
%  %  % 
No significance  28.6  40.0  14.3 
Little significance  19.0  16.0  38.1 
Moderate significance  42.9  16.0  23.8 
Considerable significance  9.5  24.0  23.8 
Great significance  -  8.0  - 
Number questionnaires  21  25  21 
Comment: RHC=reindeer herding community, FC=forest company. The answer ‘great significance’ was not 
included in the surveys 1985 and 1998. (National Board of Forestry, 1987; 1992; 2001; interviews 2004. 
 
Although the RHCs generally regard the consultations rather pessimistically, the interviews 
indicate that their significance has increased over time. A majority of the RHCs (56%) think 
that  the  importance  of  consultations  has i ncreased  over  time,  probably  due  to  increased 
knowledge of reindeer herding among forest companies, and changes in both environmental 
policy and attitudes to the reindeer herding sector. However, a third of the interviewees (34%) 
believe that the significance of consultations has not changed over time and representatives of 
three RHCs even state that the situation has become worse over time. 
 
Although most of the respondents state that consultations have improved over time, most of 
them still consider the consultations to be a forum for information, in which reindeer herders 
have very few opportunities to influence forestry and forest actions. One RHC representative 
stated, “it is wrong to call them consultations. It is no consultation if both stakeholders do not 
participate on equal terms. They present a completed plan that we use in our discussions. We 
can sometimes make changes, but then we have to offer something else. We can call them 
information meetings” (interview, 28). According to another RHC, the outcome depends on  
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which forest company, or even which representative from the forest company, is involved in 
the  consultations.  Another  reason  that  consultations  are  considered  to  have  rather  low 
significance is that the RHCs become involved quite late in the forest planning process. Many 
respondents specifically refer to this problem.  “It would be desirable to be able to influence 
forest actions at an earlier stage and have longer planning periods, like five to seven years. In 
some cases we have also managed to do that” (interview, 21). 
 
The attitudes of the forest companies towards consultation procedures are almost the opposite 
of the RHCs’. According to the cited evaluations, almost every forest company claims that 
consultations have a ‘considerable or ‘great’ impact on the planning of forestry activities. One 
forest company states that “[One] condition for reindeer husbandry is that we, as two land-
use industries, have to co-exist. The only way to do that is to conduct consultations where we 
can establish a common view of the situation.” (interview 40). Most of the interviewed forest 
companies claim that they try to find solutions that are acceptable to both sectors and that the 
consultations,  in  that  sense,  have  a  major  impact.  Differences  in  the  responses  can  be 
explained  by  the  availability  of  the  lichen  resources  and  the  attitudes  toward  reindeer 
husbandry. Many forest companies also indicate that it is becoming more difficult to consider 
the needs of reindeer husbandry since the amounts of forest mature enough to harvest (and 
thus lichen resources) are becoming increasingly limited.  This situation was confirmed by 
many of the RHCs.   
 
Thus, the stated opinions about the consultations indicate that the two actors have contrasting 
views about their significance; the reindeer herding sector perceives the consultations to play 
at best a limited role in the planning process, while the forest sector consider them to have a 
considerable or even great impact. 
   
5.2. Power distribution and consultations 
 
Previous evaluations of the consultation procedures have indicated that the power between the 
forest and reindeer herding sectors is unevenly distributed. However, they did not elucidate 
degree of this disparity, and the extent to which it affects the possibilities of the actors to 
influence the outcome of the decision-making. To measure the power distribution, in this 
study we used the ladder of co-management, by asking the respondents to define what power 
the RHCs have during consultations by pointing out the specific rung that best describes it 
(Fig. 1). 
 
Although the significance of the consultations has apparently increased over time, a fifth of 
the  RHCs  do  not  think  that  they  have  any  real  power  during  consultations  (Table  2.). 
According to these RHCs, consultations only have the character of information meetings i.e.,, 
rung 1. About half of the respondents consider their power to be limited to some sort of 
dialogue or communication in which they exchange information with the forest companies, 
but have extremely limited power. None of the RHCs feel that they have even the lowest form 
of power i.e.,, advisory power (rung 4) in the consultation procedures.  
 
The forest companies also consider the RHCs to have limited scope to affect the outcome of 
the consultation procedures. According to the median value the forest companies ascribe to 
the consultations, they seem to think that the power of the RHCs corresponds to rung 3 where 
information between the actors is exchanged and the needs of reindeer husbandry is reflected 
in  forest  planning.  Thus,  the  two  stakeholders  have  similar  perceptions  about  the  power 
distribution between the two sectors.   
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Table 2. Experienced and future possible/desired power in consultations  
 
    RHCs’ present 
influence, in %, 
according to 
  RHCs’ possible 
influence, in %, 
according to 
    RHC  FC      RHC  FC 
8  Self management  -  -      3  - 
7  Partnership  -  -      9  - 
6  Management board  -  -      3  7 
5  Co-operation  -  7      25  36 
4,5    -  7      3  - 
4  Advisory committees  -  -      38  21 
3,5    3  21      3  - 
3  Communication  19  50      -  - 
2,5    31  14      -  - 
2  Dialogue  22  -      6  - 
1,5    6  -      -  - 
1  Information  19  -      -  - 
  No influence          -  29 
  Do not know          9  7 
               
  Number interviews  32  14      32  14 
  Median  2,5  3      4  4 
Comment: RHC=reindeer herding community, FC=forest company. Many respondents had difficulties to point 
out a specific rung but placed their power between two rungs 
 
In spite of their limited power under the present form of consultations, the RHCs have a fairly 
optimistic view regarding the potential to increase their power in the future (Table 2). The 
majority of the respondents believe that it would be both possible and desirable to reach rung 
4, i.e., to at least acquire an advisory role and thereby take part in forestry planning. However, 
many of the respondents would like to increase their power in the management process still 
further and play more active roles in forest planning and in deciding the way the forests are 
managed. Some of the respondents define their attitude as being more ‘realistic’, choosing a 
low rung to describe their potential relationship with the forest companies, while others are 
more ‘optimistic‘, choosing a higher rung. A few of the respondents also expressed political 
objectives,  that  equal  partnership  should  be  promoted  or  that  the  land  that  the  Swedish 
government is accused of having stolen from the Sámi should be returned (interview 22).  
 
There were substantial variations in the forestry sector’s responses regarding future situations. 
Almost a third, 29%, of the forest companies do not consider it possible or even desirable to 
increase the power of the RHCs in the management of the resources. The argument used by 
the forest companies that want the power of the RHCs to decline, or at least not increase, is 
that they (the forest companies) are the owners of the resource, and as owners they should 
have the exclusive right to decide how it is used. Thus, these representatives of the forest 
companies do not recognise the usufructuary rights of the reindeer herding sector. Another 
argument that was raised in the interviews was that the public forest companies have little 
economic incentive (or duty) to make radical changes in forest management to serve the 
reindeer  herding  sector’s  needs,  since  their  principal  responsibility  is  to  safeguard  their 
shareholders’ interests. According to the RHCs these arguments are also commonly raised 
during consultations (interviews, 2004). However, about 20% of the companies state that the 
RHCs should have an advisory role, and 36% that there should be co-operation, i.e.,, that the 
reindeer  sector  should  have  an  input  in  forest  management  plans.  One  respondent  even 
advocated  the  establishment  of  joint  management  boards,  whereby  the  two  actors  could  
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cooperatively manage the forest resource. Although most of the respondents agree that the 
power relations between the two actors are uneven, many also agree that there is potential to 
renegotiate the relationship between them, and thus increase the influence of the RHCs in the 
forest planning process.  
 
5.3. Possible improvements in the future 
 
In the previous evaluations of the consultation procedures, the respondents were asked to 
propose measures that would improve the consultations (National Board of Forestry, 1987; 
1992; 2001). However, due to low respondent rates, it is impossible to draw any conclusions 
from the evaluations concerning this issue. For the purpose of this study, the few answers 
obtained were compiled into a list of criteria that might be used to improve the consultations. 
In  the  interviews,  the  respondents  were  then  asked  to  consider  and  rank  the  three  most 
important criteria listed (Fig. 3).   
 
Criterion   
Knowledge  
 
The two stakeholders have mutual and equivalent knowledge of each others’ industries, 
understanding of long and short term economic consequences are included. 
Level  
 
Both stakeholders have the mandate to negotiate and make decisions on behalf of their 
respective industry. 
Material  
 
Overall, maps as well as detailed maps and plans are needed for both industries as well as 
the help of modern techniques (e.g. GIS) and field visits. 
National Board of 
Forestry’s role  
 
A negotiator takes part in the consultations, i.e., the National Board of Forestry. 
Object  
 
The stakeholders agree on the object and aspects discussed in consultations; e.g. final 
fellings, soil scarification methods, fertilisation, forest roads etc. 
Objective  
 
The  two  stakeholders  have  the  same  objective  on  how  the  forest  resource  should  be 
managed. 
Result 
 
The  result  of  the  consultations  should  be  acceptable  to  both  stakeholders  as  well  as 
possible to live by. 
Trust  
 
To build trust between the stakeholders, a personal relationship has to be built up and 
meetings have to be conducted with continuity. 
 
Fig. 3. Criteria for improved consultations 
 
Both sectors agreed on the two most important criteria that might improve the consultations: 
knowledge  and  trust  (Fig.  4).  Regarding  knowledge,  one  forest  company  stated  that: 
“knowledge  creates  solid  foundations  for  co-operation.  […]  We  wish  we  had  better 
knowledge of reindeer husbandry and there is probably a lack of knowledge about forestry 
among reindeer herders as well – both biologically and economically” (interview, 4).  One 
RHC expressed similar ideas, saying, “[if] we understand each others’ industries, we can find 
common solutions” (interview, 30).  
 
According to both actors, the importance of personal relationship and creating trust is the 
second most important criterion. Knowledge and trust as well as material and results are 
criteria that the cooperating actors feel they have possibilities to improve, indicating that the 
present institutional system at least has some potential to better take into account the different 
interests of the forest and reindeer sectors.   
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Fig. 4. Ranking of the importance of criteria to improve consultations 
 
The RHCs ranked ‘material’ and ‘results’ as the third and fourth most important criteria, 
respectively, while forestry ranked them in the opposite order. A probable reason for this 
difference is that it is the forest sector that provides the materials (i.e.,, maps, plans) on which 
the consultations are based. Although some of the RHCs, with the help of the National Board 
of Forestry, are now creating similar plans, most importantly the Land Use Plan for Reindeer 
Husbandry, and maps such as those used by forestry, most RHCs still lack written material 
that can be used to show the overall impact of silviculture (and other) measures on grazing 
areas. The aim of the Land Use Plan for Reindeer Husbandry is to gain a complete picture of 
the whole land area at the disposal of each RHC. The plan has only recently begun to be 
applied,  so  there  are  still  no  results  regarding  its  effectiveness.  However,  there  are  high 
expectations regarding the usefulness of the plan during consultations with the forest sector 
(Sandström, et. al., 2003). 
 
Thus, there is no lack of ideas about how the consultations could be improved; it is the 
incentives to undertake action that seem to be missing.   
 
6. Discussion 
 
The purpose of the consultation procedures is to provide means to resolve conflicts that could 
threaten the two sectors’ continued co-existence. In accordance with the overarching principle 
guiding  Swedish  forest  policy  –  “freedom-under-responsibility”,  the  responsibility  for 
managing the forest resources is delegated to the forest and reindeer herding sectors under the 
supervision of the National Forestry Board and the FSC. The procedures thus have many 
similarities to a co-management system, since they not only provide an arena for the major 
stakeholders to negotiate issues concerning, in this case, a common forest resource, but also 
influence the distribution of power between the two sectors. 
 
The  results  show  that  representatives  of  both  RHCs  and  forest  companies  think  that  the 
significance  of  the  consultation  process  has  increased  over  time.  Representatives  of  both 
sectors point to changing attitudes, extended knowledge of the other sector, and increased 
environmental considerations as important factors behind the change. The FSC process is also 
generally  considered  to  be  important,  although  there  are  considerable  variations  in  the 
respondents’ views about its true significance.  
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Although  the  significance  of  consultations  appears  to  have  increased  over  time  and  the 
consultation procedure was introduced in the early 1980s, with the intention to foster co-
existence, most of the RHCs regard them only as a form of information meetings (rung 1 of 
the co-management ladder) or at best a dialogue (rung 2) between the two sectors in which the 
reindeer herding sector still has very little influence over the outcome of decision-making. 
Interestingly, the forest companies have a similar perception to the RHCs about the power 
distribution.  The  forest  companies  define  the  consultation  procedures  as  a  form  of 
communication  (rung  3)  through  which  the  reindeer  herding  concerns  are  expressed  and 
considered  in  the  forest  management  plans.  Although  both  sectors  thus  agree  that  the 
significance of consultations has increased over time they also agree that this change has had 
little impact on the power relations between the two sectors. Therefore, after more than 20 
years  of  consultations  the  reindeer  herding  sector  still  has  very  limited  influence  on  the 
outcome of the consultations. These findings indicate that neither of the actors’ perceptions of 
the present consultation system are consistent with a co-management arrangement as defined 
in the literature. 
 
Turning to the design principles for a viable and stable co-management system, as further 
tools to decide if the consultations qualify as a viable co-management system, only a few of 
the eight principles apply in this case. We have already concluded that principles 1, 7 and 8 
are met by the present institutional framework. However, it would be difficult to support a 
claim  that  Ostrom’s  design  principle  2,  which  states  that  there  should  be  a  proportional 
equivalence between benefits and cost, is fulfilled.  Due to the uneven power distribution, the 
ability of the RHCs to influence the outcome of the negotiations is very limited. Therefore, it 
can also be concluded that the consultation procedure does not offer the required low cost 
conflict resolution mechanism (design principle 6) or that the two actors have opportunities to 
modify the rules to any meaningful extent (design principle 3). Criticisms were also raised 
during interviews regarding the monitoring (design principle 4) and sanction system (design 
principle  5).  According  to  the  RHCs,  the  lack  of  supervision  of  forest  sector  actions  by 
responsible State agencies or the FSC, as well as the lack of an adequate sanction system, 
undermines efforts to reach compromises between the two actors. Thus, several of the design 
principles applicable to viable institutional arrangements are not fulfilled, or at least their 
applicability is disputed, so even their underlying principles indicate that the consultation 
procedures should not be regarded as a viable or stable system that safeguards co-existence 
between the two industries. There are therefore many factors that might explain why the 
reindeer herding sector has difficulties to influence the outcome of the consultations, leaving 
them  in  a  subordinate  position.  Many  of  these  factors  originate  from  the  uneven  power 
distribution,  which  in  turn  is  rooted  in  the  property  rights  situation  of  the  forest  and  the 
reindeer herding sector. However, the present situation should also be understood in the light 
of economic realities. The forest sector is one of Sweden’s most important export industries, 
so any changes that could adversely affect the profits of the forest sector have consequences 
not only for the shareholders of the forest companies, but also for the Swedish economy. 
Thus, there seems to be little incentive to initiate any changes that would adversely affect the 
productivity  of  the  sector.  Under  these  circumstances  it  is  relevant  to  ask  whether  it  is 
possible to improve the present system and, if so, how?  
 
In spite of the pessimistic results of this study many of the respondents still believe that the 
present system has some potential to take the conflicting interests of both stakeholders into 
account  and  thus  to  use  the  consultation  procedure  as  a  tool  for  co-managing  the  forest 
resource  in  northern  Sweden.  A  majority  of  the  respondents,  for  example,  think  that  an 
extended planning process, in which the reindeer sector is included in the initial phase, could  
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create better foundations for co-management and also lead to more efficient use of grazing 
areas (see also Nordh, 2000). The inclusion of the reindeer herding sector in an earlier stage 
of the forest planning process would give the sector the opportunity to play an advisory role in 
the  planning  process,  and  the  relationship  between  the  two  sectors  would  consequently 
become closer to the kind of relationship defined in the literature as co-management.  Both 
sectors  also  share  the  same  opinion  about  the  need  for  more  and  better  education  and 
knowledge concerning lichen resources and the effect of forestry on them. Both sectors also 
identify trust as an important factor for maintaining a viable co-management system. Trust 
among representatives from the two industries is, however, probably more difficult to create 
than  an  adequate  knowledge  base.  In  situations  where  there  is  a  lack  of  trust,  some 
respondents wish that it would be possible to appoint a mediator in order to resolve conflicts 
between the actors, for example the National Board of Forestry. Another problem that could 
be relatively easily addressed is the currently limited access to material and information. The 
lack of information makes it difficult to take into consideration the needs of the reindeer 
herding sector, and according to some of the respondents from the forest sector, the RHCs 
would probably also be able to use the land more efficiently if they had access to better 
material. The development of the Land Use Plan for Reindeer Herding and the advanced 
computer techniques used by the forest sector today could help to improve this situation.  
 
However, when asked about the objectives of the consultations neither of the two groups 
considers joint objectives to be an important criterion for improving consultations. In CPR 
theory, objectives are an important criterion. Joint objectives do not mean merely having a 
joint practical goal, but also having joint objectives regarding how to manage the resource and 
to co-manage the resource effectively. This problem was reflected in the analysis of the power 
distribution  among  the  actors,  since  the  RHCs  wanted  to  gain  more  power  over  forestry 
decisions, while some of the representatives from the forest sector had the opposite desire. 
The differing views about the objects and joint objectives may thus also partly explain why 
the consultation procedure is still limited to dialogue or communication and does not extend 
to co-operation and partnership.  
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
Although the forestry and reindeer herding sectors both have formal rights to use the forest 
resource, albeit for different purposes, this study clearly confirms that the present institutional 
system does not sufficiently protect the rights of the reindeer herding sector. In addition, the 
consultation procedures and the corresponding elements of the FSC-standards do not meet the 
institutional  design  principles  that  characterize  viable  and  stable  co-management 
arrangements.  As  such  they  cannot  be  defined  as  appropriate  means  to  resolve  conflicts 
between the two actors.  
 
As  we  assumed  initially,  the  property  rights  situation,  manifested  in  the  uneven  power 
distribution within the consultation procedures, is an important factor that can at least partly 
explain  the  shortcomings  of  the  present  institutional  framework.  This  was  not  taken  into 
account by the government when designing the institutional framework within current forest 
policy, but since the lichen resource is becoming scarcer and the conflict over forest resources 
is consequently intensifying, it seems necessary to adjust the present management system in 
order  to  take  into  account  the  needs  of  both  the  reindeer  and  forestry  sectors  if  the  two 
industries are to continue to co-exist in the future.  
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Many of the respondents also perceive that improvements can be made within the present 
institutional  system.  Some  of  these  improvements  have  been  proposed  by  the  actors 
themselves in this study. Implicit in these proposals are the need to develop tools to better 
value  different  undertakings  and  adjustments  to  each  other’s  needs  in  economic  terms. 
However, since the issues involved in this case have both economic and cultural dimensions, 
assessments of the implications of planned actions should consider not only economic factors 
but also their possible cultural consequences. A combination of targeted changes to the FSC 
criteria and enabling legislation, including clauses clarifying Sámi land use rights, is probably 
needed to create a viable and stable system to co-manage forest resources in northern Sweden. 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
The  authors  are  grateful  for  comments  by  Carina  Keskitalo,  Anna  Zachrisson  (Umeå 
University), Göran Bostedt, Peichen Gong and Cecilia Håkansson (Swedish University of 
Agricultural Sciences). The authors thank three anonymous reviewers for valuable comments, 
which helped to improve the paper immensely. This study is part of the Mountain Mistra 
Research  Programme,  financed  by  the  Swedish  Foundation  for  Strategic  Enviromental 
Research (MISTRA). 
References 
Abbot, J., 1996, Sharing the City: Community Participation in Urban Management, Earthscan: London. 
Arnstein, S.R., 1969. A Ladder of Citizen Participation. American Institute of Planners Journal, 35, 216-224. 
Bachrach, P., & Baratz, M.S, 1970, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice, Macmillian Press: London & 
Basingstoke. 
Berkes, F., 1994. Co-management: Bridging the Two Solitudes. Northern Perspectives, 22(2-3), 17-21. 
Björklund, 2000. Hänsyn till renskötsel vid långsiktig planering av virkesproduktion. Delprojekt Vindeln, Umeå, 
SLU & Skogsvårdsstyrelsen.  
Bostedt, G.Parks, P. J. Boman, M., 2003. Integrated Natural Resource Management in Northern Sweden: An 
Application to Forestry and Reindeer Husbandry. Land Economics. 79(2), 149-159. 
Bostedt,  G.,  2005.  Pastoralist  Economic  Behaviour:  Empirical  Results  from  Reindeer  Herders  in  Northern 
Sweden, Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 30(2), 381-396. 
Campbell, T., 1996, Co-management of Aboriginal Resources. Information North 22, no. 1: 1-6..  
Dahl, R. A., 1957. The concept of Power. Behavioral Science 2: 201-215. 
Danell, Ö., 2004. Hur allvarlig är sitationen för rennäringen? In Esselin, A. (ed). Fjällen i Fokus. En konferens 
om fjällens möjligheter och begränsningar. Fjällmistra report 7, pp. 6-7. 
De Paoli, M.L., 1999, Beyond Tokenism: Aboriginal involvment in Archaeological Resource Managemenbt in 
British Columbia, Graduate Thesis: University of British Columbia, Vancouver.   
Gustavsson, K., 1989. Rennäring: en presentation för skogsfolk. Jönköping, National Board of Forestry.  
Hahn, T., 2000. Property Rights, Ethics and Conflict Resolution. Foundations of the Sami Economy in Sweden, 
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala. 
Hamilton, A., 2003. Effektivare samråd mellan rennäring och skogsbruk, Paper 2003:3, Jönköping, National 
Board of Forestry. at www.svo.se/forlag/rapporter/1720.pdf, accessed October 2006. 
Jentoft, S., 2003. Co-management, the Way Forward. in Wilson, D. C., Nielsen,  J. R. & Degnbol, P, (eds.)., The 
Fisheries Co-management Experience, Accomplishments, Challenges and Prospects. Kluwer Academics, 
Boston. pp. 1-14. 
Kjellin, P. (2001). Skogspolitiken idag – en beskrivning av den politik och övriga faktorer som påverkar skogen 
och skogsbruket. Jönköping, (SUS) 2001.  
Kooiman, J., 2003. Governing as Governance. London, Sage. 
Lundmark, L., 1998. Så länge vi har marker. Stockholm, Prisma. 
Lukes, S., 1974, Power: A Radical View, The Macmillian Press: London & Basingstoke. 
Mattson, L., 1981. Relationen skogsbruk - rennäring. Report nr 2, Umeå, Department of Geography, Umeå 
University.  
Merriam, S.B. 1994, Fallstudien som forskningsmetod, Lund: Studentlitteratur.  
National Board of Forestry, 1987. Utvärdering av samråden 1984-1985 Skogsbruk och rennäring. Paper 1987:3, 
Jönköping: National Board of Forestry.   
    17 
National Board of Forestry, 1992. Utvärdering av samråden Skogsbruk och rennäring. Paper 1992:3 Jönköping: 
National Board of Forestry.  
National  Board  of  Forestry,  2001.  Utvärdering  av  samråden  1998  Skogsbruk-rennäring.  Paper  2001:6, 
Jönköping: National Board of Forestry.  
Nordh, M., 2000. Modellstudie av potentialen för renbete anpassat till kommande slutavverkningar. Working 
paper 77. Umeå: Department of Forest Resource Management and Geomatics, Swedish University of 
Agricultural Sciences.  
Ostrom, E., 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford. 
Pinkerton,  E.  W.,  1989,  Co-Operative  Management  of  Local  Fisheries:  New  Directions  for  Improved 
Management and Community Development. UBC Press:Vancouver.. 
Pinkerton, E.W., 2003. Towards specificity in complexity: Understanding co-management from a social science 
perspective.  In:  Wilson,  D.  C.  et.  al.,  The  Fisheries  Co-management  Experience,  Accomplishments, 
Challenges and Prospects. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrechts, Boston, London, pp.61-78. 
Prop. 1990/91:3. Swedish Parliament (Riksdag), 1991. Proposition ‘Hänsynen till rennäringen’. 
Prop. 95/96:226, Swedish Parliament (Riksdag), 1996. Proposition ‘Hållbar utveckling i landets fjällområden’. 
Sandström, P. et.al., 2003. Conflict Resolution by Participatory Management: Remote Sensing and GIS as Tools 
for Communicating Land-use Needs for Reindeer Herding in Northern Sweden. Ambio, 32(8), 557-567. 
SKSFS 1993:2. National Board of Forestry. Skogsstyrelsens föreskrifter och allmänna råd till skogsvårdslagen 
(1979:429). at www.svo.se, accessed in October 2006.  
SOU 2001:101. 2001. En ny rennäringspolitik. Betänkande av Rennäringspolitiska kommittén, Statens offentliga 
utredningar. Fritzes: Stockholm.  
Skogsstatistisk årsbok. 2004. 
Skogsstatistisk årsbok. 2000.  
Statistics Sweden. 1999. Svensk rennäring. Gulls Tryckeri, Halmstad.  
Swedish Forestry Act. 1979:429.  
Swedish Reindeer Husbandry Act .1971:437.  
Widmark, C. 2006. Forestry and Reindeer Husbandry in Northern Sweden - the Development of a Land Use 
Conflict. Rangifer. 27 (2). pp. 43-54 
Frågor om rennäringen, 2000.  www.ac.lst.se/files/Xvj22gsG.pdf, accesible in October 2006.  
www.fsc-sverige.org, accessed in October 2006.  
www.sjv.se/amnesomraden/djurveterinar/rennaring/nyckeltalforrennaringen/antalforetagochrenagare.4.7502f61
001ea08a0c7fff54245.html, accessible in October 2006.  
www.svo.se, accessed in October 2006.  